The PCSA’s centerpiece is a harsh earnings cap for all college athletes. At minimum, those athletes could collectively receive only 22 percent of the revenue derived from their performances through their schools and conferences. There are a variety of conditions that could raise that cap for individual schools to accommodate women’s sports and Olympic events, but not by much and not for everyone. This would effectively entrench a recent court settlement—more on that later—into federal law for 10 years unless Congress reauthorizes it. The NFL, NHL, and NBA distribute between 45 and 50 percent of their revenue to players, by comparison.
The bill also sharply limits athletes’ ability to switch schools by only allowing it to happen once without penalty. Future transfers would cost athletes a year of eligibility, which would be capped at five years, outside of a few narrow exceptions—if their school eliminates a sport, for example, or a head coach is fired or hired elsewhere. To further reduce athletes’ bargaining power, the PCSA would impose a strict recruiting window of between two to five weeks. This would constrain athletes’ ability to shop around for the best deal, so to speak, after proving themselves.
In addition to all of this, the NCAA and its components would receive two long-sought objectives. One is preemption of state laws. By legislating on these issues, Congress would be explicitly barring state legislatures from passing their own laws to regulate compensation and other key issues for college athletes. Second, and even more importantly, the PCSA gives the NCAA immunity from federal antitrust laws when it enforces rules on compensation, transfers, broadcast rights, and more among member schools and conferences. Federal antitrust laws have been a powerful tool for college athletes to keep at least some of the wealth that they generate for themselves. With the PCSA, Congress would slam that door shut.
